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SUMMARY ARGUMENT 
Respondent ("LPDC") fails to address in Respondent's Brief the District Court's 
failure to apply the requirements of Rule 54(d)(l)(B) when making its prevailing party 
determination. The District Court erred in failing to consider the Final Judgment or 
result of the action in relation to the relief sought. "Relief sought" in the context of 
Rule 54(d)(l)(B) means the relief demanded in the complaint. In making its 
determination, the District Court did not even refer to the "relief sought" by LPDC in the 
complaint, namely, stopping Appellants ("Harveys") from irrigating all 220 acres of their 
farmland. Harveys are the sole prevailing party in this action because the final judgment 
or result of this action is that none of the "relief sought" by LPDC was granted and 
Harveys may continue to irrigate all 220 acres of their farmland. 
The District Court erred in adopting an interpretation of the rule set forth by this 
Court in Acarrequi which would severely penalize any condemnee who successfully 
defeats a condemnor's claim that condemnation is necessary. Contrary to LPDC's 
arguments on this issue, this Court should rule that a successful condemnee may obtain 
an award of attorney fees and costs. Also, LPDC has not appealed from the District 
Court's ruling that the relief sought by LPDC would constitute a taking for which just 
compensation should be paid; therefore, the District Court's ruling that this is a 
condemnation action should not be disturbed on appeal. 
Due to the errors of the District Court mentioned above, this Court should reverse 
the District Court's determination on the prevailing party issue and rule that Harveys are 
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the sole prevailing party. Further, this Court should rule that Harveys, who have 
successfully defeated LPDC's attempt to condemn their property, may be awarded 
attorney fees and costs under LC. § 12-121 and the rule set forth in Acarrequi. 
FACTS 
I. Contest of Factual Assertions made by LPDC. 
A statement of relevant facts is set forth in Harveys' opening brief ("Appellant's 
Brief'); however, in Respondent's Brief, LPDC makes several statements relating to facts 
and the underlying proceedings that are inaccurate and not supported by the record. At 
several points in Respondent's Brief, LPDC claims, directly and also by inference, that 
Harveys' irrigation practices are the cause of slides on the hillside above the ditch. Such 
assertions by LPDC are not supported by any evidence in the record and the issue of 
causation was never addressed by the District Court. The following subparagraphs in this 
section address a few of LPDC's assertions that are erroneous. 
A. Prior litigation with Rex Knudson is irrelevant. 
As mentioned by LPDC, in 2006 a slide occurred and a home owner sued 
Harveys and LPDC. In the early stages of this litigation, Harveys were dismissed from 
the law suit. The case continued to trial where LPDC attempted to push all blame and 
liability for the slide onto a non-party, namely, Harveys. The District Court in this case 
ruled that the Knudson litigation was irrelevant because Harveys did not have the chance 
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to defend themselves in that prior litigation. As the District Court stated, it was easy for 
LPDC in the Knudson litigation to push the fault on to a "ghost defendant that's not in 
the courtroom to defend themselves." 05/27/09 Transcript, p. 14:23-24. Further, the 
District Court ruled: 
"Harvey requested this Court to prohibit LPIC from mentioning in anyway 
the Knudson jury verdict. Harvey argues that they were not parties at the 
time of the jury verdict in Knudson v. Lower Payette Irrigation Ditch 
Company, Washington County Case No. CV-2006-588. They settled and 
were dismissed by Knudson. LPIC did not cross-claim to keep Harvey in 
the Knudson lawsuit. LPIC chose to defend against Knudson negligence 
claim by presenting evidence that Harvey was the proximate cause of 
Knudson's damages. LPIC convinced the Knudson jury that Harvey's 
negligence was 95% responsible for the Knudson damages. This Court has 
consistently informed the parties that the Knudson matter did not 
involve identical issues as the case at issue. It did not have identical 
parties since Harvey was dismissed prior to jury trial. Harvey 
participated in the Knudson jury trial only as a witness. LPIC had a 
different burden and standard of proof in Knudson than in the case at issue. 
LPIC is not entitled to a jury trial on its requested relief of declaratory 
judgment and permanent injunction. Consequently, the Knudson jury did 
not actually decide the issues before this Court or render a final 
judgmeat on the merits. Ticor Title Co. v. Stantion, 144 Idaho 110, 157 
P.3d 613 (2007). 
This Court will continue to rule that the Knudson jury verdict is 
irrelevant. IRCP 401 and 402. If the Knudson jury verdict has any 
probative value on the matters at issue, then it is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues and misleading to the 
advisory and trial jury. IRCP 403 .... " R. at 667-68. 
LPDC has not objected to or appealed from the District Court's ruling that the 
Knudson jury verdict is irrelevant to the present case. Yet, LPDC argues before this 
Court as if the Knudson jury verdict is authoritative and controlling authority. As 
recognized by the District Court, the Knudson jury verdict did not decide the issues 
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raised in this case nor can it be used as evidence against Harvey's who were not parties to 
the Knudson case at the time of trial. 
B. The hillside has been sliding for decades prior to Harvey's use of the 
property. 
LPDC claims that "Soon after the Harveys began irrigating their property on the 
bluff, the hillside beneath the property began to move causing substantial maintenance 
problems for the Ditch Company." Response Brief, p. 4. However, LPDC's expert 
report done in March 1997 by Holladay Engineering Co. entitled "Alternatives Study 
Slope Failure Mitigation Lower Payette Ditch Company''and LPDC's 2008 collaborative 
report both state: 
"Since the canal was built near the tum of the century upon the tow of the 
slide, it can be inferred that the slide has been in existence prior to this 
time. A 1951 edition USGS, 7 .5-minute, topographical map also indicates 
that the slump features were present by the time of map printing (see 
location map). The head scarp was reportedly first noted in the 1940' s and 
described as appearing similar to a small cattle trail." R. at 73, 172. 
Both of LPDC' s expert reports also acknowledged that "a ditch map dated January 1975 
by SCS noted that the area several hundred feet downstream from the diversion structure 
known as the Buttermilk Slough No. 1 was in need of repair in order to control sloughing 
and erosion of the canal banks." Ibid. These references to LPDC's own expert reports 
totally refute LPDC's claims that the hillside began moving "after the Harveys began 
irrigating". 
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C. It has not been proven that Harvey's irrigation practices have any effect 
upon the hillside. 
At several points in Respondent's Brief, LPDC argues as if it is a foregone 
conclusion that Harvey's irrigation effects the hillside or is the cause of the slides. 
However, this issue was never decided by the District Court. Further, the evidence 
ascertained through discovery showed that Harveys irrigation practices did not effect the 
hillside and therefore LPDC would not be able to meet its burden had this case proceeded 
to trial. The District Court, after reviewing the expert reports and evidence that LPDC 
was proposing to present at trial, advised LPDC that based upon what had been 
submitted, which was all of LPDC's exhibits, reports and evidence, the District Court did 
not feel that LPDC would be able to meet its burden at trial. The District Court stated, ". 
. . in ordering, as Plaintiffs would like this Court to order, to deprive Harveys of all 
irrigation of the 220 acres, the plaintiffs would have to show that that [, Harvey's 
irrigation of the property,] is the cause of the slide. And based upon the review of the file 
and the affidavits and the matters that have been presented to this Court so far, I'm not 
sure that they can show that that is the cause of the slide." 06/18/10 Transcript, pp. 
32:21-33:3 (This statement was made by the District Court after all motions, exhibits and 
jury instructions had been submitted to and reviewed by the District Court). One of 
LPDC's own expert reports even concludes that water infiltration from the ditch itself is 
likely the principle contributor to the hillside instability. R. 74, para. 3. 
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Before the District Court and now before this Court, LPDC refuses to accept 
responsibility for their own actions in causing the slides that have effected the ditch. Had 
this matter proceeded to trial, Harvey would have presented evidence showing that just 
prior to each slide which occurred during the past twenty years, LPDC has removed 
substantial amounts of dirt from the toe of the slide area thereby accelerating instability 
of the hillside and causing the slides. Had this matter proceeded to trial Harveys would 
have also presented evidence showing that soil moisture sensors installed in aid of 
discovery proved that Harvey's irrigation water did not penetrate past the roots of their 
crops and that all irrigation water was entirely evaporated or used up by the crops. 
Further, had this matter proceeded to trial Harveys would have presented 
evidence, including LPDC's own expert reports, showing how all the experts agree that 
on at least 90% of Harveys 220 acres which are at issue, Harvey's irrigation practices 
have absolutely no effect upon the hillside. The evidence would also show that as for the 
remaining 10% of the farm land Harvey's irrigation practices are prudent, reasonable, and 
allow no water to infiltrate into lower ground levels that could effect the hillside. 
In considering the issues presented on appeal, this Court should remember that the 
issue of causation has never been decided. LPDC cannot push the blame or its own 
negligence upon Harveys. LPDC's attempts to cast Harveys as wrongdoers or to claim 
that Harveys' irrigation practices have caused sliding of the hillside are not supported by 
the record and should not be given any weight by this Court. 
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D. The merits of LPDC's summary judgment motion were never considered 
by the District Court because LPDC's motion was untimely. 
In Respondent's Brief, LPDC states, "The district court did not reach the merits of 
the summary judgment action because the parties entered into a stipulated resolution of 
the case in July 20 I 0, that adopted the relief requested by the Ditch Company." This is a 
false statement of the proceedings in the District Court. Contrary to LPDC's assertion, 
the District Court did not reach the merits of LPDC's summary judgment motion not 
because of the parties' stipulation but rather because LPDC's summary judgment motion 
was untimely filed. The District Court ruled that pursuant to Rule 56(a) summary 
judgment motions must be filed at least 60 days prior to trial and LPDC's motion would 
therefore not be considered by the District Court because it was not filed at least 60 days 
prior to trial. 06/18/10 Transcript, pp. 17:9-18:4. The parties' negotiations resulting in 
a stipulation did not begin until after the District Court had already denied LPDC's 
summary judgment motion. 
LPDC is trying to bootstrap its untimely summary judgment motion onto the 
District Court's ruling because it was in this summary judgment motion filed just before 
trial that LPDC first sought relief which could be related to the parties' stipulated 
resolution and the District Court's Final Judgment. Prior to filing its untimely motion 
for summary judgment, LPDC consistently and exclusively sought the relief prayed for 
in its complaint, namely, an order prohibiting Harveys from irrigating all 220 acres of 
their farmland. From the time this case was initiated by LPDC in February 2009 until 
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June 2010, LPDC demanded that all irrigation of Harveys' 220 acres be stopped and 
LPDC never once indicated that it wanted or would accept anything different. Then in 
June 2010 only a few weeks before trial, and only after the District Court had told LPDC 
that it wouldn't be able to meet its burden of proof based upon the evidence that had been 
submitted, LPDC entirely gave up on the "relief sought" in the complaint and instead 
sought a way to back out of this lawsuit by proposing a resolution that would allow 
Harveys to apply the same amount of irrigation water on all 220 acres as had been 
applied in the years prior to this lawsuit. Nowhere in the documents that were timely 
filed and considered by the District Court did LPDC ever request any relief different than 
what is requested in its complaint. LPDC's summary judgment motion was dismissed as 
untimely by the District Court and should therefore not be considered when determining 
the "relief sought" by LPDC in this action. 
ARGUMENT 
II. The District Court abused its discretion by failing to consider the relief 
obtained by LPDC in relation to the relief sought by LPDC. 
As set forth in LPDC's complaint, the relief sought byLPDC was to entirely and 
totally stop irrigation by Harveys of all 220 acres of their farmland. At no time has 
LPDC received even part of this relief sought in its complaint. In Respondent's Brief, 
LPDC argues that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding there is no 
clearly prevailing party because LPDC "did prevail on its preliminary injunction motion, 
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received substantial concessions from the Harveys regarding their irrigation practices as a 
result of the relief provided by the Stipulation, and the parties are operating under the 
continuing restrictions and privileges through a stipulated settlement ... " Respondent's 
Brief, p. 14. However, neither the preliminary injunction nor the stipulation awarded any 
of the relief sought by LPDC. 
Rule 54( d)( 1 )(B) requires that in determining the prevailing party the final 
judgment or result of the action must be considered "in relation to the relief sought." 
IRCP Rule 54( d)(l )(B). The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently used the term "relief 
sought'' when referring to the demand for relief contained in a party's complaint. See 
Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 324, 715 P.2d 993 (1986)(see also the concurring opinion 
at 110 Idaho 328); Pro Indiviso, Inc. v. Mid-Mile Holding Trust, 131 Idaho 741,745,963 
P.2d 1178 (1998); Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912,916,684 P.2d 314 (1984); Idaho Dept 
of Labor v. Sunset Marts, Inc., 140 Idaho 207,209, 91 P.3d 1111 (2004); Spokane 
Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616,226 P.3d 1263, 1266 (2010); 
Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375,234 P.3d 699, 704 (2010). 
A comparison of the relief sought with the relief actually obtained is set forth in 
Harveys' opening brief. Additionally, this Court should note that the preliminary 
injunction entered by the District Court did not enjoin Harveys from irrigating even one 
acre of their farmland nor did it require Harveys to apply less water than they had been 
applying. The preliminary injunction merely required that Harveys not apply excess 
water and divert surface run-off water away from the hillside. Harveys have never 
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applied excess water and there is no allegation or evidence to the contrary. And, as 
acknowledged by the District Court, surface run-off water had already been diverted 
away from the hillside. 05/27/09 Transcript, p. 98:15-17. The preliminary injunction 
entered by the Court did not grant the relief sought by LPDC in its complaint nor did it 
grant the relief sought in its motion for a preliminary injunction, namely, stop Harveys 
from irrigating their 220 acres of farmland; thus, it was an abuse of discretion for the 
District Court to rule that LPDC was a prevailing party just because a preliminary 
injunction was entered without considering the relief obtained in relation to the relief 
sought by LPDC. 
At the hearing on Harveys request for attorney fees and costs, the District Court 
did review the terms of the parties' stipulation and indicated which party the District 
Court felt had prevailed as to each term of the stipulation. However, at no time during 
the hearing or in the District Court's orders does the District Court consider the terms of 
the stipulation or of the Final Judgment in relation to the "relief sought" by LPDC. 
LPDC concedes as much on page 11 of Respondent's Brief where it states, "On a 
provision-by-provision analysis the district court found that both parties had made 
concessions and that the Ditch Company had prevailed in part on most of the 
requirements set forth in the stipulation." Respondent's Brief, p. 11. Here LPDC 
acknowledges that the District Court only looked at the stipulation without any reference 
to the actual relief sought in LPDC's complaint. 
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LPDC, in Respondent's Brief, also fails to consider the relief obtained in relation 
to the "relief sought." Both parties gave concessions as part of the stipulation. None of 
the concessions obtained by LPDC from Harveys were ever part of the "relief sought" in 
LPDC's complaint or in any other document timely filed with the District Court. Rather 
than apply 54(d)(l)(B) and actually consider the relief obtained in relation to the relief 
sought, both the District Court and LPDC in Respondent's Brief only look at the relief 
obtained. Had the District Court actually applied Rule 54(d)(l)(B) and considered the 
relief obtained with the relief sought, it could not have held that LPDC prevailed in part 
because LPDC obtained absolutely none of the "relief sought" in its complaint. Whereas, 
on the other hand Harveys obtained the most favorable outcome that could be achieved, 
namely, dismissal of LPDC's complaint. See Sanders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 
823,827 (Ct. App. 2000).1 
III. The District Court abused its discretion by failing to properly apply this 
Court's holding in Acarrequi. 
LPDC argues that Ada County Highway Dist. v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 
P.2d 1067 (1983), does not apply to this case and therefore the District Court properly 
1 Whereas, Harveys were successful in obtaining dismissal of LPDC's complaint it was 
not necessary for the District Court or the parties to address Harveys' counterclaim, 
which was operative only in the event that LPDC was successful in obtaining the relief 
sought in its complaint. See Sainsbury Const. Co., Inc. v. Quinn, 137 Idaho 269,274, 47 
P .3d 772 (Ct. App. 2002)(holding that it was not necessary to address additional claims 
for relief when party had already obtained full relief). 
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denied attorney fees and costs to Harveys. LPDC argues that in order for Acarrequi to 
apply "the action must be for eminent domain, and a condemnation or talcing of property 
must actually have occurred." Respondent's Brief, p. 15. Contrary to LPDC's 
argument, this is a condemnation action and condemnation need not actually occur in 
order for an award of attorney fees under Acarrequi. 
A. This is a condemnation action because LPDC seeks to take Harveys' 
constitutionally protected property for which just compensation should be 
paid. 
I. Harveys' water rights are protected property. 
The beginning points for the protection of property rights are the U.S. 
Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. The U.S. Constitution provides that private 
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. 
V. The Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516,523 n. 11, 102 S.Ct. 781, 788 n. 
11, 70 L.Ed.2d 738, 746 n. 11 (1982). The Idaho Constitution provides that "[p]rivate 
property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained 
in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefor." Idaho Const. art. I, § 14. 
Federal and Idaho case law have held that water rights are property subject to the 
constitutional prohibition from the talcing of private property without just compensation. 
In Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 83 S.Ct. 999 (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized that in the construction of water projects the government cannot deprive 
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landowners of appurtenant water rights without "the imposition of such a servitude [as] 
would constitute an appropriation of property for which compensation should be made." 
Id. 372 U.S. at 625. Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that "A 
water right is tantamount to a real property right, and is legally protected as such", Crow 
v. Carlson, 107 Idaho 461,465, 690 P.2d 916 (1984), and also that "water rights are real 
property rights which must be afforded the protection of due process of law before they 
may be taken by the state. Idaho Const. Art 15, § 4; Anderson v. Cummings, 81 Idaho 
327,340P.2d 1111 (1959);Follettv. Taylor Brothers, 77Idaho4I6,294P.2d 1088 
(1956)." Nettleton v. Higginson, 98 Idaho 87, 90,558 P.2d 1048 (1977). 
The Idaho statutes continue the protection of water rights. LC. § 55-101 codifies 
the principal that water rights and appurtenances to land are real property. And, as it 
relates to the present case, LC. § 42-912 requires that" 
"Any person, company or corporation owning or controlling any canal or 
irrigation works for the distribution of water under a sale or rental thereof, 
shall furnish water to any person or persons owning or controlling any 
land under such canal or irrigation works for the purpose of irrigating such 
land ... " (Emphasis added). 
And, once the water has been dedicated to use upon a tract ofland; the owner of the land: 
" ... his heirs, executors, administrators, successors or assigns, shall not 
thereafter be deprived of the annual use of the same when needed for 
agricultural or domestic purposes upon the tract ofland for which such 
appropriation or use has been secured, or to irrigate the land so settled 
upon or improved ... " LC.§ 42-914 (Emphasis added). 
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The Idaho Code further protects the land owner's water rights by stating that so long as 
contractual payments for use of the water are made (i.e., assessments): 
" ... a perpetual right to the use of water necessary to irrigate a certain 
tract ofland is secured, said water right shall forever remain a part of 
said tract ofland, and the title to the use of said water can never be 
affected in any way by any subsequent transfer of the canal or ditch 
property or by any foreclosure or any bond, mortgage or other lien 
thereon; but the owner of said tract of land, his heirs or assigns, shall 
forever be entitled to the use of the water necessary to properly 
irrigate the same, by complying with such reasonable regulations as may 
be agreed upon, or as may from time to time be imposed by law. LC. § 
42-915 (Emphasis added). 
These same rights of the landowner were recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Barclay. 56 Idaho 13 (1935), where the Supreme 
Court, after clarifying that the appropriation rights are owned by the irrigation district, 
stated that : 
''The right to the use of such water after having 'once been sold, rented or 
distributed to any person who has settled upon or improved land for 
agricultural purposes,' becomes a perpetual right subject to defeat only 
by failure to pay annual water rents and comply with the lawful 
requirements as to the conditions of the use. (Sec. 3, art. 15 of the 
Constitution; Bardsley v. Boise Irr. & Land Co., 8 Idaho 155, 67 Pac. 428; 
Wilterding v. Green, 4 Idaho 773, 45 Pac. 134.)" Id., 56 Idaho at 18 
(Emphasis added). 
Applying these authorities to the facts in this case, Harveys right to use the water 
represented by their shares in LPDC is a constitutionally and statutorily protected 
property right. 
2. Relief sought by LPDC constitutes a taking of property. 
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In Count Two ofLPDC's Complaint, LPDC "seeks an order of this court 
enjoining the Defendants Robert I. Harvey and Margaret Harvey from pumping water 
from the Lower Payette Ditch for irrigation of their approximately 220 acre parcel on top 
of the bluff adjacent to and to the east of the Lower Payette Ditch." R. at 9-10. Such 
relief would permanently preclude Harveys from using their real property (i.e. dedicated 
water rights) and would severely damage Harveys' 220 acres of irrigated farmland. In 
effect, the injunction sought by LPDC would be a complete physical taking of Harveys' 
water rights. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has reasoned that appurtenant water rights are 
sufficiently similar to appurtenant easements ''to have the relevant law applicable to 
appurtenant easements apply to appurtenant water rights." Joyce Livestock v. United 
States, 144 Idaho 1, 156 P.3d 502, 514 (2007); see also, Bothwell v. Keefer, 53 Idaho 
658, 27 P.2d 65 (1933). In the court reasoned that "like easement" water rights 
are: 
" ... beneficial and useful adjuncts" to the property"; 
" ... [the water rights] would be oflittle use apart from the operations of the 
ranch"; 
" ... the patented property alone was not sufficient to sustain a livestock 
operation"; 
" ... water rights would be oflittle use independent of the ranch properties." 
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Id. at 514. 
Each of the similarities pointed out in the Joyce case also apply to the present 
case: Harveys' water rights are "beneficial and useful adjuncts" to the land; Haverys' 
water rights "would be oflittle use apart from the operation of the ranch [farm];" without 
the water rights, Harveys' property cannot sustain his livestock operations on the farm; 
and Harveys' water rights ''would be oflittle use" independent of the land. 
Easements cannot be taken or acquired without just compensation through an 
eminent domain action. See LC. §42-1106; Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557,394 
P .2d 641 ( 1964 ). Just as the taking away of an easement would be a taking of property 
subject to just compensation, the taking of Harveys' water rights is a taking of property 
subject to just compensation. 
Further, in Roark v. City of Caldwell, the Idaho Supreme Court stated (quoting 
the Texas Supreme Court in The Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350,235 S.W. 513, 
514, 19 A.L.R. 1387 (1921)): 
"Property in a thing consists not merely in its ownership and possession, but 
in the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment and disposal. Anything which destroys 
any of these elements of property, to that extent destroys the property itself. The 
substantial value of property lies in its use. If the right of use be denied, the value 
of the property is annihilated and ownership is rendered a barren right." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also declared that: 
"Any destruction, interruption or deprivation of the common, usual 
and ordinary use of property is by the weight of authority a taking of one's 
property in violation of the constitutional guaranty." Knowles v. New 
Sweden Irr. Dist., 16 Idaho 217,231, 101 P. 81, 86 (1908); see also, 
Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 294, 328 P .2d 397, 401 (1958); Farris v. 
City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 583, 347 P.2d 996 (1959). 
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Appling these quoted rulings of the Idaho Supreme Court, the LPDC's request to 
preclude Harveys' use of their water rights would destroy the property itself because all 
''value of the property is annihilated and the ownership is rendered a barren right." 
Further, enjoining Harveys' use of the property would clearly be a "destruction, 
interruption or deprivation" of its common, usual and ordinary use. Thus, under Roark 
and Knowles the relief sought by LPDC would effectuate a taking of Harveys' property 
and, more specifically, a taking of their water rights. 
Also, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that interference with a person's 
water rights is a taking subject to just compensation. In Dugan v. Rank, the court held: 
"A seizure of water rights need not necessarily be a physical invasion ofland. It 
may occur upstream, as here. Interference with or partial taking of water rights in 
the manner it was accomplished here might be analogized to interference or 
partial taking of air space over land, such as in our recent case of Griggs v. 
Allegheny County. 369 U.S. 84, 89 -90 (1962). See United States v. Causby, 328 
U.S. 256,261 -263, 267 (1946); Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 
329 (1922). See also 1 Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States (3d ed. 1911), 
15; 2 Nu::hols, Eminent Domain (3d ed. 1950), 6.3. Therefore, when the 
Government acted here "with the purpose and effect of subordinating" the 
respondents' water rights to the Project's uses "whenever it saw fit," "with the 
result of depriving the owner of its profitable use [there was] the imposition of 
such a servitude [as] would constitute an appropriation of property for which 
compensation should be made." Peabody v. United States, 231 U.S. 530,538 
(1913); Portsmouth Co. v. United States, supra, at 329." Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 
609, 625-26, 83 S.Ct. 999 (1963). 
And in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 291 (1958), when 
discussing the acquisition by the Government of water rights necessary to carry out a 
reclamation project, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that water rights must be acquired by 
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"paying just compensation therefore, either through condemnation or, if already taken, 
through action of the owners in the courts." Id. 
Accordingly, under both state and Federal case law, permanently enjoining 
Harveys from using their water rights, as requested by Plaintiff, is a taking of Harveys' 
property which requires just compensation and, although disguised as a declaratory 
judgment and injunction action, LPDC's complaint states an action to condemn Harveys' 
property. 
It should also be noted that the District Court has ruled on this issue and such 
ruling has not been objected to or appealed by LPDC. See Appellant's Brief, p. 29 
(quoting District Court's ruling). In ruling on this issue the District Court also clarified 
that LPDC was asking to take Harveys' property in the interest of the public good. 
06/18/10 Transcript, p. 24:10-23. Again this ruling of the District Court has not been 
appealed by LPDC. 
B. Actual condemnation is not required for an award of attorney fees under 
Acarrequi. 
Before condemning property, "a plaintiff must show that "the taking is necessary 
to such use." LC.§ 7-704." Erickson v. Amoth, 112 Idaho 1122, 1124, 739 P.2d 421 (Ct. 
App. 1987). In fact this showing of necessity has been incorporated as one of the factors 
to be considered under Acarregui, specifically, the factor is referred to as the 
controverting of the public use and necessity requirement. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 878. 
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In the present case, the principle issue contested by the parties over more than seventeen 
months was the necessity of granting the relief requested by LPDC, namely, the taking of 
Harveys' water rights. LPDC claimed that such a taking was necessary for the public 
good (i.e., the good of LPDC's water users in Washington and Payette counties). On the 
other hand, Harveys claim that the use of the water rights has no effect upon the hillside 
and therefore the relief requested by LPDC is not necessary. Harveys have expended 
over one hundred-thousand dollars controverting the necessity of taking their water rights 
by LPDC. Now LPDC asserts that Harveys, or any condemnee for that matter, cannot be 
awarded attorney fees if the outcome of this Acarrequi-factor is entirely in the 
condemnee' s favor. LPDC argues that there must be an actual taking in order for fees to 
be awarded. Respondent's Brief, p. 23. Under LPDC's argument, a condemnee must 
lose on the issue of controverting the public use and necessity in order to be awarded 
attorney fees. LPDC's argument makes no sense and would penalize every condemnee 
who successfully controverts a condemner's claim of public use and necessity. The 
Supreme Court in Acarrequi did not intent to impose such a penalty on successful 
condemnees, rather, the Court recognized that justice may require a condernnee' s 
attorney fees to be awarded even when the condemnee loses on the public use and 
necessity issue. Under Acarrequi, controverting public use and necessity is a factor to be 
considered when determining whether to award fees in a condemnation action - a factor 
which obviously weighs heavily in favor of awarding the condemnee's fees when, as in 
the present case, the condemnee successfully controverts the condemner's public use and 
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necessity claim. The nonsense of LPDC's argument is that under such an argument a 
condemnee is penalized for successfully defending against condemnation of the property 
whereas an unsuccessful condemnee may be rewarded with attorney fees. This Court 
should not adopt such an illogical application of the rule adopted in Acarrequi, rather, this 
Court should clarify that controverting a condemner's claim of public use and necessity 
is a factor to be considered when awarding fees and it is a factor that will weigh heavily 
in favor of a condemnee who successfully controverts such claim. 
It was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to not apply this factor, or the 
other Acarrequi factors, when it denied Harveys' request for attorney fees. 
IV. The parties' stipulation does not preclude Harveys from seeking and receiving 
an award of attorneys fees and costs. 
The District Court properly ruled that the parties' stipulation did not settle the 
issue of attorneys fees and costs as there was no ''meeting of the minds" on this issue. 
08/17 /10 Transcript, pp. 173:7-174:23. LPDC has not appealed this ruling of the District 
Court. However, without citing to any error by the District Court, LPDC argues that the 
parties' Stipulation, which in final form was prepared by LPDC, precluded Harveys from 
pursuing an award of costs and fees because the right to do so was not expressly 
preserved in the stipulation. LPDC's argument is contrary to the facts and the law. The 
facts reviewed by and statements of the District Court show that there was no meeting of 
the minds on this issue. The District Court stated: 
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". . . And I say there was not a meeting of the minds in the 
stipulation with regard to attorney fees and court costs, and that's set forth 
in - I couldn't find it this morning but it's a supplemental affidavit of 
Shelley M. Davis in support ofreply memorandum in support of objection 
and motion to disallow costs, and it was Exhibit 7 to that affidavit, and it 
states, With respect - this is a letter from Albert Barker to Lary C. Walker, 
and dated July 1, 2010, says, With respect to your position on attorney 
fees I restate our position. Lower Payette Ditch Company did not stipulate 
to authorize Harveys to seek an award of costs and fees and Lower Payette 
Ditch Company will oppose any effort to obtain any - an award of costs 
and fees. 
"And then I referred to an affidavit, or relied upon an affidavit of 
Lary C. Walker in support of defendant's response memorandum filed 
August 10, and attached to that affidavit was an exhibit - on or 
Attachment D. And in that, the letter was from Walker to Barker, it's 
dated July 1, and it says, "This letter confirms our understanding and 
agreement to the stipulation for entry of court order forwarded by your 
office on June 28. It is our understanding that the stipulation does not 
limit or preclude Harveys from seeking an award of attorneys - attorneys 
fees and/or costs incurred in defending this action. Toe, quote, claims and 
causes of action, quote, referred to in Paragraph 17 do not include motions 
for attorney fees and costs. It is with this understanding the Harveys enter 
in to and agree to the stipulation." 
"So there were simultaneous discussions at the time of settling the 
main issues of the lawsuit and it clearly shows there was no meeting of the 
minds oc agreement as to the attorney fees and court costs, so the court 
will have to consider Harveys' motion for attorney fees and court costs." 
08/17/10 Transcript, pp. 173:10-174:23. 
Also, under these facts, the case of Straub v. Smith, 175 P.3d 754 (Idaho 2007), is 
directly on point and is controlling authority on this issue. 
In Straub, the Plaintiff, Straub, argued that the defendant waived the right to 
pursue costs and fees because the right to do so was not expressly reserved in the 
stipulation. Toe Idaho Supreme Court disagreed with Straub and held: 
24 
"A stipulation is a contract, and we will apply contractual principles of 
interpretation when reviewing a stipulation. Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., 
Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 611, 114 P.3d 974, 981 (2005); Win ofMichigan, Inc. 
v. Yreka United, Inc .. 137 Idaho 747, 750-51, 53 P.3d 330, 333-34 (2002). 
"The determination and legal effect of a contractual provision is a question 
of law." Maroun 141 Idaho at 611, 114 P.3d at 981. Our primary 
objective when interpreting a contract is to discover the mutual intent of 
the parties at the time the contract is made. Opportunity, L.L.C. v. 
Ossewarde. 136 Idaho 602, 607, 38 P.3d 1258, 1263 (2002). "If possible, 
the intent of the parties should be ascertained from the language of the 
agreement as the best indication of their intent." Id. We construe the 
contract against the person who prepared the contract. Win of Michigan, 
Inc .. 137 Idaho at 751, 53 P.3d at 334. 
''The stipulation, which was prepared by Straub, is silent on the issue of 
costs and fees. There is nothing to indicate that when the Smiths signed 
the stipulation, the silence indicated an intent that the Smiths would forego 
the opportunity to pursue an award of costs and fees. Furthermore, we 
have said costs and attorney fees are collateral issues which do not go to 
the merits of an action and that a district court retains jurisdiction to make 
such an award after a suit has been terminated. Inland Group of Cos., Inc. 
v. Obendorff. 131 Idaho 473, 475, 959 P.2d 454, 456 (1998). Thus, the 
stipulation to dismiss the case with prejudice must be interpreted not 
to include any agreement regarding costs and fees, which can be 
awarded after a suit is terminated. Hence, we hold that although the 
dismissal was pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41(a)(l), the Smiths did not waive 
their claim for fees and costs by failing to expressly reserve that issue 
in their stipulation." Id. 175 P.3d at 758. 
Accordingly, LPDC's argument on this issue is without merit. 
V. LPDC is not entitled to an award of costs and fees on appeal. 
In this appeal, Harveys have raised legitimate legal issues as to the interpretation 
of the term "relief sought" as used in Rule 54( d)(l )(B) of the IRCP and the application of 
this rule's requirement that the relief obtained be considered "in relation to the relief 
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sought." In the context of this rule, the term "relief sought" has never been defined by 
the IRCP or Idaho's appellate courts. Looking at this term together with Rule 8 IRCP 
and the case law interpreting Rule 8 IRCP, the term "relief sought" must be interpreted to 
mean the demand for relief set forth in the complaint. Applying this interpretation, the 
District Court clearly abused its discretion by failing to consider the relief obtained by 
LPDC in relation to the relief sought in LPDC' s complaint. In raising these issues on 
appeal, Harveys are not asking this Court to merely second guess the District Court as 
LPDC asserts. Rather, Harveys are seeking an interpretation of Rule 54 and that this rule 
be applied in this case whereas the District Court entirely failed to apply the requirements 
of this rule (i.e., consideration of the relief obtained in relation to the relief sought) when 
determining the prevailing party issue. LPDC, without citing to the record or transcripts, 
asserts that the District Court did weigh the "results obtained to the relief sought." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 22. LPDC did not provide citations to the record or transcripts, 
because the District Court never referred to or considered the ''relief sought" by LPDC in 
this action. In making its prevailing party determination, the District Court only 
considered the relief obtained. The District Court reviewed the parties' stipulation and 
then provided its view of which party was benefited by each term of the stipulation; this 
is not what Rule 54 requires. 
Further, Harveys have raised the issue that attorney fees may be awarded to a 
condemnee when a condemnee successfully controverts the condemnor's claim of public 
use and necessity. The District Court's ruling and LPDC's arguments would deny 
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attorney fees to every condemnee who successfully defeats the condemnor's claim of 
public use and necessity. On this issue, Harveys request that this Court property clarify, 
interpret and apply the rule set forth in Acarrequi so that successful condemnee's will not 
be penalized by defeating the condemnor' s public use and necessity claim. 
In seeking interpretation and application of Rule 54 and by seeking review of the 
District Court's interpretation and application of the rule in Acarrequi, Harveys have not 
pursued this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation and, therefore, 
LPDC is not entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in failing to apply the requirements of Rule 54(d)(l)(B) 
when it determined that both parties prevailed in part. Rule 54(d)(l)(B) requires that the 
relief obtained be considered in relation to the relief sought. In making its prevailing 
party determination, the District Court only looked at the relief obtained. If the relief 
obtained is considered in relation to the relief sought, LPDC cannot be considered to be a 
prevailing party. The only relief sought by LPDC in this action was to stop Harveys 
from irrigating all of their 220 acres of farmland. The result obtained in this action 
provides that Harveys may continue to irrigate all 220 acres of farmland and apply the 
same amounts of water that they have always applied. In successfully and completely 
defending against LPDC's request to shut off irrigation of Harveys' farmland, Harveys 
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are the sole prevailing party. The concessions made by Harveys in the parties' stipulation 
did not give LPDC any of the "relief sought" in this litigation. 
The District Court also erred when it ruled that in order to award attorneys fees 
and costs under Acarregui, the condemnee must lose on the issue of controverting the 
claims of public use and necessity thereby resulting in condemnation of the property. 
This Court should reverse the District Court and hold that a condernnee, like Harveys, 
who retains the subject property by successfully defending against the condemnor's 
claims of public use and necessity, may be awarded attorney fees and costs. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein and also in Appellant's Brief, Harveys 
request that this Court reverse the District Court's order granting LPDC's Motion to 
Disallow Costs and Fees. 
Respectfully submitted: April ---"""---' 2011. 
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